In this paper we address the general question of how social influence determines collective outcomes for large populations of individuals faced with binary decisions. First, we define conditions under which the behavior of individuals making binary decisions can be described in terms of what we call an influence-response function: a one-dimensional function of the (weighted) number of individuals choosing each of the alternatives. And second, we demonstrate that, under the assumptions of global and anonymous interactions, general knowledge of the influence-response functions is sufficient to compute equilibrium (and even non-equilibrium) properties of the collective dynamics. In general, we find that collectives making very different kinds of decisions can exhibit surprisingly similar behavior; and conversely, that very similar types of decisions can yield collective behavior that is dramatically different.
Introduction
is positively related the size of the relevant "network" associated with the product/skill; thus it is effectively a function of the previous decisions of others.
The pervasive and multifarious nature of social influence makes it a topic of great relevance to much of social science; however, it also renders the concept somewhat difficult to describe precisely. In order to gain some analytical traction on a potentially diffuse problem, we therefore restrict our discussion of social influence to the class of binary decisions (i.e. choices between precisely two discrete alternatives) that exhibit what we will call "decision externalities", by which we mean simply that the likelihood of each individual choosing one alternative over another is a function of the number of others choosing each alternative. 1 At the cost of some precision, previous models of binary decisions with externalities can be divided into three broad categories to which we refer as heuristic models, mechanistic models, and social utility models respectively. 2 Heuristic models, which dominate the diffusion of innovations and collective action literature (Roy M. Anderson and Robert M. May, 1991; Edward L. Glaeser et al., 1996 ; M. S. Granovetter, 1978 , and Duncan J. Watts, 2002) , begin from the presumption that individual actors "adopt" some practice (which can be variously an item, a procedure, or an idea) as a consequence of being exposed to it by other actors (who can be individuals or organizations). Although these models can differ considerably in their specific assumptions about how exposure leads to adoption, all of them either explicitly or implicitly assume the logic of contagion; that is, that "susceptible" individuals can be "infected" purely by exposure to existing "infectives". Heuristic models have the great advantage that once the infection rule is specified, the exercise of computing the equilibrium, or even non-equilibrium, behavior of the collective dynamics is relatively straightforward 3 an "information cascade". 4 An alternative strand of mechanistic models, following Schelling Young, 1993 Young, , 1998 ).
Finally, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) analyze the properties of the Nash equilibrium in very general games. In particular, they study games with strategic complementarity, which broadly corresponds with the positive externality games in our setting. 5 The downside of mechanistic models is that they are difficult to generalize to examples other than those from which their micro-mechanical description is derived. For example, while it is clear that in each of the above examples, individual decisions are subject to externalities, it is unclear how the information cascades discussed by Bikhchandani et al. regardless of whether the externality in question derives from the assumption that others have information that one lacks, or from the decisions makers utility being contingent on the contributions of others. But short of a unifying framework under which both kinds of externalities can be subsumed, it is impossible to say what those conditions might be, or 4 Banerjee (1992) has independently proposed a similar model, with similar results, and Arthur and Lane (1993) have extended the approach to decisions in which risk-averse agents observe private signals of predecessors as well as their actions. 5 We extend Milgrom and Roberts (1990) since apart from strategic complentarity games we also consider sbustitute gams and combinations of both types of games. In other aspects, however, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) is more general because it allows for a larger strategy space.
how lessons learned in one context might be applied in another.
One possible compromise between the generality of heuristic models and the economic rationality of mechanistic models is the class of "social utility" models, first introduced by Leibenstein (1950) , and later applied specifically to the case of binary decisions by Brock and Durlauf (2001) and others. 6 Brock and Durlauf (2001) identify two specific functional forms that social utility might hypothetically take: "proportional spillovers", according to which social utility increases linearly with the expected number of others; and "pure conformity", according to which social utility diminishes quadratically away from the mean response. They then derive expressions governing the equilibrium states of the collective decision dynamics, corresponding to the proportional spillovers and pure conformity utility functions respectively. Other work in the same tradition also introduces one of these two functional forms for social utility in their respective utility functions with analogous consequences. Young and Burke (2001) , for example, introduce a proportional spillover term, and Bernheim (1994) , Bicchieri and Fukui (1999) , and Blume and Durlauf (2003) all invoke terms that correspond to pure conformity.
Although less arbitrary than heuristic models and more general than mechanistic models, social utility models are in some ways an awkward compromise. It remains ultimately unclear, for example, on what basis individuals should derive utility from the choices or attitudes of others; thus one cannot say with confidence why one particular functional form for the "social" part of the utility function should be preferred over another, and which functions are appropriate to which applications. Furthermore, unlike heuristic models which at least in principle, could be estimated empirically, it is unclear how one would go about measuring social utility. And finally, social utility models, although formulated intuitively, still present considerable analytical difficulties with respect to computation of collective dynamics, especially for heterogeneous populations.
Acknowledging the difficulty that social utility models have attempted to overcome-that is, combining the economic rationality of mechanistic models with the generality of heuristic models-this paper adopts an approach to the problem that omits the explicit formulation of social utility altogether. We achieve this goal in two, analytically distinct stages. First, we define conditions under which the myopic-best response of individuals making binary decisions in the presence of social influence can be described in terms of what we call an influence-response function: a one-dimensional (i.e. scalar) function of the (weighted) number of others choosing each of the alternatives. As we will discuss below, our formulation of influence-response functions, although restricted in some important ways, encompasses a wide range of interesting applications. And second, we demonstrate that, under some additional conditions, reasonably general knowledge of individual influence-response functions is sufficient to compute the equilibrium, and even non-equilibrium, properties of the collective dynamics. Importantly, our method for computing collective dynamics-which is standard in the field of nonlinear dynamics, but which appears to be little known in economics 7 -is reasonably simple to perform in practice, and generalizes easily to allow for heterogeneous populations, synchronous and asynchronous updating, and stochastic as well as deterministic best-responses.
Our analytically distinct treatment of individual and collective behavior is central to our approach, and has a number of advantages. First, it permits us to treat in a unified way a number of applications, which at face value seem quite different. For example, we can compute the equilibrium behavior of a large population engaged in certain kinds of public goods games in the same way that we would for certain kinds of social learning problems, possibly even with the same equilibria, even though the two "games" arise from very different micro-origins. Second, and conversely, our approach also permits us to differentiate between applications, such as public goods games with slightly different shaped production functions, which are superficially very similar but which result in qualitatively distinct collective behavior. Finally, as we discuss briefly in Section 3, in cases where it is not possible to derive the relevant influence-response functions from first principles, one may nevertheless be able to measure them directly, perhaps through experiments. Because, in such cases, it would still be possible to compute collective equilibria, the separation of individual from collective behavior may have empirical advantages as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our analytical framework for characterizing binary decision externalities, and then derive the type of influence-response functions for a number of specific cases. In Section 3, we introduce some additional assumptions regarding how individuals in a population of decision makers interact with each other, and then show how under these conditions, our framework of influence-response functions leads to particularly simple methods for computing collective equilibria, outlining solutions both for discrete (synchronized) and continuous (asynchronized) updating of decisions. In Section 4, we outline some extensions to the basic model, including stochastic best responses; and in Section 5, we conclude.
Binary decisions and externalities
Our first goal is to outline a framework for relating the externalities that pertain to various decision making scenarios to individual-level decision rules that is both general, in the sense 7 Schelling 1973 introduces the same idea, but does not develop it in detail.
that it encompasses all the particular examples discussed above, yet precise in the sense that the parameters which appear in the decision making rule can be interpreted in terms of the motivating application, and hence are amenable to measurement. In order to proceed, however, we require some analytical distinctions, both with respect to the origins of decision externalities, and also their form.
With regard to origins, we distinguish between what we call implicit and explicit decision externalities. Explicit externalities arise whenever the utility ascribed to one alternative over another is a direct function of the (absolute or relative) number of others choosing that alternative. Implicit externalities, however, arise indirectly as a result of inferences that individuals make about information regarding the decision that is held by others, and that they obtain through some sampling procedure. Both explicit and implicit externalities can arise in a variety of circumstances, and within each broad class there exist additional subclasses; however, all obey this basic distinction. Implicit and explicit externalities, notably cannot be derived from any common framework: although they may or may not have the same effective implications for decision making, they are simply of different origins.
With respect to form, we identify three kinds of externalities-strictly positive, strictly negative, and non-monotonic-where the first two kinds correspond loosely to Leibenstein's (1950) characterization of "bandwagon" and "snob" effects, and the third can be regarded as a mixture of the other two (M. S. Granovetter and R. Soong, 1986). In our scheme, positive externalities pertain whenever the probability of choosing a particular alternative increases with respect to the number of others choosing it, and negative externalities imply the opposite. In our usage, the presence of non-monotonic externalities implies that externalities are positive when the number of adopters is low, but that they become negative as the number of adopters increases (where clearly other combinations are possible). For example, in fashion, one may not wish to adopt a new style until it has been adopted by sufficiently many others (a positive externality), but one may also lose interest in the same style once it has been adopted by too many others (a negative externality).
cially may appear hard to distinguish (for example, between two public goods with different shaped production functions). Furthermore, as we will show in Section 3, the distinction between monotonic and non-monotonic externalities is consequential, as the collective dynamics corresponding to each case will generally display qualitatively distinct properties.
Before proceeding to derive influence-response functions for binary decisions, we require one additional restriction on our model-that social influence satisfies what we call the assumption of "independent effects". By this assumption, we mean that the influence an individual experiences as result of another individual 's action is independent of the influence experienced from any other individual. To put it differently, independent effects assumes that one considers the action of other individuals as decisions taken simultaneously, and therefore independently of each other. 9 Although this assumption is quite general-it does not require, for example, that all influences be felt equally, or that the resulting influence- that an individuals observations of others are unordered. 10 We do not believe, however, that this simplifying assumption overly restricts the applicability of our model, as for most of the situations in which we are interested (typically including large number of individuals), the knowledge and computational capacity required to condition influence on some exogenously defined ordering would seem to exceed even quite generous estimators of human rationality.
In what follows, we explain why, under this assumption, individuals' behavioral rules (or best responses) can be described by simple one-dimensional functions of an aggregate "social signal". To formalize matters, let N = {1, ...n} be a finite but large set of individuals and A = {0, 1} be the common set of actions. That is, every individual makes a binary decision a i ∈ A (e.g. whether or not to adopt a certain behavior, purchase a product, participate in a riot, contribute to a public good, etc.). For every i, let b a −i = (a 1 , ..., a i−1 , a i+1 , ...a n ) ∈ A n−1 be the action profile representing the behavior of the remaining individuals in the population.
We define a function, R i :
Notice that this function is contingent exclusively on the action profile of others, therefore the order in which one samples is irrelevant and the actions of others are considered as simultaneous decisions. We note that if the best response is deterministic
The next result shows how R i (b a −i ) can be expressed in terms of a one-dimensional function. 
where
, the social signal, is defined given the vector of weights {w ij } j∈N\{i} as follows:
As illustrated in Figure 1 , to prove this proposition, we have to show that R i can be expressed as a composition of the functions k i and r i . Obviously, it is enough to prove that there exists a vector of weights {w ij } j∈N \{i} such that k i is an injective function (i.e.,
, since this would then allow us to define r i as a function satisfying that
. A constructive proof of the existence of these weights is presented in the appendix.
Insert Figure 1 about here Although, in principle, the weights could simply be considered as abstract parameters used to construct a one-dimensional map, we concentrate here on situations where the weights are actually interpretable and reflect the relevance (or importance) that each interaction impinges on the decision under consideration. To be precise, w ij represents the importance that i attributes to j's action. Hence, the influence structure determined by the weights can be interpreted as a weighted social network where, N i = {j ∈ N s.t. w ij > 0} is the set of individuals with whom i interacts (or whom he cares about). If w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N , the social network is unweighted although directed. The network is undirected if in addition
In Section 4 we illustrate how stochastic influence-response functions might arise. Nevertheless, for concreteness, we focus here exclusively on the deterministic case. Notice that any deterministic influence-response function r i (k i ) is characterized by a finite number of thresholds, as illustrated in Figure 2 . Formally, given r i (k i ), there exists k
Insert Figure 2 
12 Notice that, in the case of unweighted networks, positive externalities simply imply that the higher the number of individuals choosing action 1 in ones neighborhood, the higher the probability of choosing 1. And finally, in the extreme case where the network is complete and unweighted, positive externalities simply mean that the higher the overall number of adopters of action 1, the higher the probability of adopting 1. As illustrated in Figure 3 .b, if the influence-response function is decreasing (negative externalities), it is characterized by a downward threshold k
. 13 14 Finally, a non-monotonic influence-response function is typically characterized by multiple thresholds. For concreteness, in this paper we focus on the case with two thresholds; an upward threshold k 
. This case is illustrated in Figure 3 .c.
Insert Figure 3 about here
We emphasize that there may be many real world examples leading to these different forms of externalities. For example, if everybody expects nobody to applaud between the movements of a quartet, hardly anybody will, which makes this situation akin to the upward threshold influence-response function case. By contrast, when attending to a party, if you expect everybody to bring drinks you may think of bringing food. This also represents a critical 12 This situation corresponds with a version of positive externalities where, if we compare the probability of choosing action 1 when a set of individuals, say S, are choosing 1, with the corresponding probability when there is a larger set of individuals choosing 1 (say S 0 ) which contains S (i.e. S ⊂ S 0 ), then the latter probability is higher or equal than the former one. 13 Notice that we are assuming that the influence-response function r i (k i ) evalutated at the threshold always takes the value of its right lateral limit. For example,
14 This specification may also be interpreted as a general definition for negative externalities that coincides with the standard one if the network is complete and unweighted. Specifically, if we compare the probability of choosing action 1 when a set of individuals, say S, are choosing 1, with the corresponding probability when there is a larger set of individuals choosing 1 (say S 0 ) which contains S (i.e. S ⊂ S 0 ), then the latter probability is lower or equal than the former one. mass phenomenon but with the opposite effect, that is, where there is a tendency to anticoordinate or, in other words, to coordinate on different actions. Finally, upward-downward influence-response functions are also possible. In fashion, for example, people are often unwilling to purchase a product until some number of others have done so, but the same product can be once more unappealing when it becomes too popular.
As discussed above, influence-response functions, in addition to exhibiting multiple functional forms, can also arise in many circumstances and for different reasons. In the following sections we propose two frameworks to account for what we refer to as explicit and implicit externalities; that is, two fundamentally different origins for social influence that nevertheless can lead to very similar behavior. In order to formally explain the difference between explicit and implicit externalities, we must pay careful attention to the micro-mechanical details of the adoption process. To do so, we follow a mechanistic (or social utility) approach and incorporate the costs and benefits of choosing one action or the other in the analysis.
Therefore the payoffs (or utilities) of individuals become part of the model. Although, this may be unnecessary for obtaining predictions about the collective outcomes, one clear advantage of tracing incentives to primitives related with costs and benefits is that it enables us to ask questions of whether or not we obtain efficient outcomes in equilibrium (in the sense of maximizing the total benefit to society) or, if instead, there is some tension between individual and collective incentives. Furthermore, the parameters of the models become interpretable and policy implications are, in principle, understandable.
Explicit externalities
Explicit externalities arise when the utility assigned to an action depends explicitly on the absolute or relative number of individuals choosing the action. For example, the benefits of using a particular computer language depend on the size of the population using the same language. In this example, there are at least two reasons for such effect. First, due to compatibility issues, the more people adopting the product, the easier it becomes to exchange information with them. Second, services and accessories are more readily and cheaply available the larger the population of users, where this second effect also applies to less obvious examples of network externalities such as choosing among brands of cars, digital cameras, etc.
To formalize matters, assume that each individual i ∈ N is characterized by a utility function. Invoking the same argument used for the construction of the one-dimensional influenceresponse function, the utility of an individual can be represented as a function of the social signal k i . That is, every i ∈ N is characterized by a utility function u i :
Let 5u i (·, k i ) represent the difference in utility between choosing action 1 or action 0 given a particular value of k i . More precisely,
Assuming that individuals are utility maximizers, i will choose action 1 if 5u i (·, k i ) ≥ 0, and action 0 otherwise, (where for simplicity we consider that if 5u i (·, k i ) = 0, action 1 is chosen). If
is increasing with respect to k i (u i satisfies increasing differences) then i is subject to positive externalities, which in turn implies that her influence-response function is characterized by an upward threshold. Similarly, if 5u i (·, k i ) is decreasing with respect to k i (u i satisfies decreasing differences) the externalities are negative, and thus, i's influence-response function is characterized by a downward threshold. 15 Finally, influence-response functions with multiple thresholds are only possible if the utilities have non-monotonic differences, i.e.
is non-monotonic (or similarly, the externalities are non-monotonic). Note that, two individuals with the same thresholds do no necessarily need to have the same utilities, whereas obviously two individuals with the same utilities always have the same thresholds.
Furthermore, the population will typically be characterized by a distribution of thresholds and, as shown later in the paper (Section 3), this information is sufficient to compute the equilibrium, and even non-equilibrium, properties of the collective dynamics. In contrast, if we want to evaluate the efficiency of the outcomes, information about utilities is also needed. 16 To summarize, one can determine the form of the externality simply by analyzing the monotonicity with respect to the social signal of the difference in utilities of choosing action 1 and action 0. We next illustrate how this analysis can be performed in two different scenarios: technology adoption and public goods.
Technology adoption
Consider the model of technological adoption proposed by Katz and Shapiro (1985) . 17 Consider two technologies a = 0 and a = 1, where the "intrinsic" utility of adopting technology a for individual i is given by b a (i). Letting p a denote the price of purchasing technology a, then the overall utility of individual i is equal to
where ν a (k i ) represents the network effects for a ∈ {0, 1} and
is the social signal. Obviously, the standard assumptions in the context of technology adoption are that ν 1 (k i ) increases with respect to k i , whereas ν 0 (k i ) decreases with respect to k i ; hence the difference in utility between choosing 1 or 0 is
from which it follows that
As a consequence, the externalities are positive and thus individuals' influence-response functions are characterized by an upward threshold that depends on the parameters of the model as well as the specific forms of the functions ν a (k i ), where a ∈ {0, 1}. Notice that one can consider other markets (apart from technology) such as clothing or art where nonmonotonic externalities may arise. These examples would correspond to non-monotonic functions ν 1 (k i ) and ν 0 (k i ). We note also that this model encompasses as a particular case (when ν a (k i ) is a linear function of k i ) the standard social interaction models where individuals play a bilateral game with each neighbor. If the game is a coordination game the externalities are positive whereas if the game is an anti-coordination game the externalities are negative. Finally, we observe that if ν 1 (k i ) and ν 0 (k i ) are determined from primitive assumptions of the economic and psychological decision process, our model would therefore fit into the category of mechanistic models, whereas if these functions are determined as simple heuristics of how the behavior of others affects ones utility, our model would follow a social utility approach.
Public good games
Public good games represent another class of games from which influence-response functions can be simply derived. 18 Public goods appear in many different contexts such as health insurance, public transportation, environmental issues, and innovation, among others. In all these cases, each individual has to decide whether to invest (a i = 1) or not, (a i = 0) in some public good where the cost of investing is c i > 0. Let G i (a i , b a −i ) be the production function from the perspective of player i, meaning that G i (a i , b a −i ) determines the benefits obtained by player i given his own action a i and the action taken by the remaining players, b a −i . For simplicity assume that the social network is unweighted; that is, w ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N , and therefore n i denotes the size of i's neighborhood. It is straightforward to
show that the production function can be expressed in terms of a function (also referred as the production function for i) g i : [0,
is the number of individuals that have invested in i's neighborhood.
Then, for any player i ∈ N , her utility or payoff is
and player i will choose to invest if and only if
It is always the case in public good games that an individual's utility increases with the number of contributions of others; that is, the production function is always increasing (i.e. will it be a downward threshold function. Finally, if g i is convex for low values of k i and concave for high values of k i (i.e. a sigmoid function) the influence-response function will exhibit two thresholds, an upward and a downward threshold. 19 Knowing the shape of the production function, which in principle can depend on the particular context, is therefore relevant since the predictions for the collective dynamics will critically depend on this feature. In many examples of public goods proposed in the literature the production function is concave, corresponding to the classical free-riding phenomenon in which incentives to contribute decrease with the number of contributors. There is also relevant work, however, that deals with non-concave production functions. For example, Winter (2005) studies a situation where individuals have the option of reducing the probabilities of failure of a joint project by investing towards their decisions. In such a scenario, the production function is convex and thus the incentives to contribute increase with the number of contributors. Note that public good games constitute a class of games from which all three forms of externalities may easily arise: positive, negative and non-monotonic. As a consequence public good games which are superficially very similar (i.e. with slightly different shaped production functions) can result in qualitatively distinct collective behavior. Conversely, applications which at face value seem quite different, such as technology adoption and some kinds of public good games, can lead to similar qualitative aggregate outcomes.
In the next section we extend our framework to include implicit externalities, showing that even "games" derived from entirely distinct origins, can be (in some circumstances) treated in a unified way.
Implicit externalities
Implicit externalities arise indirectly as a result of inferences that individuals make about the information regarding the decision that is held by others. Unlike explicitly externalities, we assume that the utility of choosing one action is independent of the number of individuals choosing the same action. Nevertheless, since individuals are uncertain about the utility corresponding to each action, the information about the actions taken by other individuals in the population is used to reduce this uncertainty and infer the optimal choice.
For example, the number of people in a restaurant may be taken as a signal of the quality of the food. Also, information regarding which books (or CDs) are best-sellers might constitute an important influence on purchase decisions precisely because of this signaling effect. Using the behavior of others as a screening device is enhanced when the market is complex and sufficient knowledge is needed to make an optimal judgement, such as in the case of unfamiliar products with multiple brands. Notice that we assume that individuals are uncertain about the benefits corresponding to the purchase of the goods, which implies that these are goods whose characteristics can only be well known after use.
There are many ways one can describe a model with uncertainty; here we take a very simple but standard approach to the problem. For concreteness, assume that there are only two states of the world relevant for the decision (e.g., high and low quality of a new technology) and individuals are uncertain about which is the real state. An individual's utility depends on his action (adopt or not the new technology) and the state of the world. Formally, for all i ∈ N , let A = {0, 1} be the set of possible actions where if a i = 0 agent i does not adopt (e.g. does not purchase the product), and if a i = 1 agent i does adopt (e.g. purchases the product). Let W = {w 0 , w 1 } be the possible states of the world. Then, u i : W × A → R + is the utility function that maps both the action of individual i and the state of the world to i's utility.
Initially, we assume that all players are choosing action 0 and thus obtain a utility of u i (w 0 , 0) = u i (w 1 , 0) which is independent of the state of the world. However, if an individual decides to adopt, her utility would be u i (w 1 , 1) or u i (w 0 , 1) in state of the world w 1 and w 0 respectively. We assume u i (w 1 , 1) ≥ u i (w 0 , 1) as well as a symmetry condition, which implies that the difference between choosing the optimal and suboptimal action in each state of the world is the same, i.e.,
We also assume that individuals know their utilities conditional on the state of the world but not which state pertains. Under these conditions, their best response is to choose the action a * i that maximizes their expected utilities, that is,
where ; whereas if the state of the world is w 1 , the signal is 1 with probability p. Therefore, p measures the accuracy of the signal: the higher the value of p, the more informative the signal becomes. Furthermore, p need not be the same across individuals; it can be obtained from a distribution (with f (p) and F (p) as pdf and cdf respectively) where p is the average accuracy. 20 Consider first the case where an individual, say i ∈ N , only observes her own signal before making a decision. Assume also that, a priori each state of the world is equiprobable. That 
By symmetry, we can show that
where Pr(w 0 | s i = 0) is the probability assigned to state w 0 , after receiving a signal of 0.
If s i = 1, choosing 1 has a higher expected utility than choosing 0. Specifically 
Consider now a more general situation. Assume that in addition to receiving a private signal, individual i observes the action taken by n i other individuals before making his decision. More specifically, assume that k i of them are choosing 1 and n i − k i are choosing For part (ii), we consider that an individual applies Bayes rule to update her beliefs after observing her own signal and all other signals. 21 Since she does not know the signal's accuracy of others, we assume that she takes as an approximation the average p; however, she does know the accuracy of her own signal p i . Therefore, if s i = 1
is the probability assigned to state w 1 , given that k i neighbors are choosing action 1 and n i − k i are choosing action 0.
Equation (2) can also be written as
Given that the utilities are symmetric, action 1 is preferred to action 0 if and only if Pr(w 1 |
. Then action 1 is chosen (after receiving a signal of 1) if and only if
Assuming now that s i = 0, then
thus, action 1 is chosen if and only if
Note that, if the signal's accuracy is equal to the average p, the thresholds are ni−1 2 and ni+1 2 after a signal of 1 and 0 respectively. A consequence of this observation, illustrated in Figure 5 , is that if p i > p, the two thresholds spread out; whereas if p i < p, the thresholds become closer.
Insert Figure 5 about here 21 Applying Bayes rule and pluralistic ignorance at the same time might seem like a logical contradiction.
Really, however, we are assuming bounded rationality, and Bayes rule is just a well defined way of saying that people do, in fact, make inferences from behavior of others. As we will show, Bayes rule leads to simple heuristics that seem plausible, thus ultimately it is irrelevant whether individuals actually apply Bayes rule or use some other procedure (Gigerenzer, Todd and Group, 1999) .
To conclude, the influence-response function that arises from our simple inference procedure is:
There is, of course, nothing unique about this procedure, and one could propose other, equally valid procedures for deriving social influence from the observation of other people's actions. Furthermore, while only upward thresholds arise in this model, one could also think of ways to generalize it to account for other forms of externalities (e.g. assuming that individuals have opposite preferences, and that this is common knowledge). The important point is that although implicit externalities are based on a different set of assumptions than explicit externalities, the consequence for the functional form of the decision rule can be qualitatively indistinguishable. For example, if we compare the model of implicit externalities proposed here with the example of public goods with a convex production function introduced in Section 2.1.3, we find that the behavior of individuals in both scenarios is characterized by an upward threshold which will ultimately give rise to very similar qualitative collective outcomes.
To conclude with the first part of the paper, we reiterate that our aims are two-fold: (1) To provide a unified framework for studying social influence, and show how a wide range of micro-mechanisms can be characterized by simple influence-response functions. (2) To study how individual response functions aggregate and produce collective dynamics. Up to this point, we have focused on the first question; in what follows we address the second.
Collective dynamics
Although useful for the purposes of deriving influence-response functions, in reality our distinction between explicit and implicit externalities is somewhat artificial, for two reasons.
First, many real decision making situations may very well embody both kinds of externalities, which in practice may be difficult or even impossible to disentangle. For example, when an individual is observed to change her behavior to conform to some group norm, did she do so because (a) she privately disagrees with the norm, but wants to avoid sanctioning from other group members; (b) the benefits of group coordination are so great that the precise norms on which they are coordinated are irrelevant; (c) her beliefs have shifted unconsciously through repeated exposure to group beliefs; or (d) she has made a conscious decision to alter her beliefs on the assumption that "everyone else can't be wrong"? In this hypothetical scenario, the first two explanations represent explicit externalities, and the latter two represent implicit externalities, where in each case the underlying psychology and cost-benefit analysis (if there is one) may be quite different. In truth, however, probably all these effects are in play simultaneously, and thus it may be ultimately unhelpful to draw distinctions between them.
A second potential problem with separating explicit and implicit externalities is that in many strategic situations, even in relatively simple two-player games, the players may have considerable uncertainty regarding the strategies being employed by their opponents, or even the game they are playing. Thus in order to optimize their expected utilities over time, players must engage in what is called "strategic learning" (Young, 2004) , which involves both explicit and implicit externalities. As with the scenario above, it may be impossible in practice to determine how much of the social influence players feel can be attributed to learning from others, and how much is inherent to the structure of the underlying game itself.
In both these scenarios, however, it may still be possible to elicit an individual's influenceresponse function empirically, either from data or controlled experiments. We are not aware of any explicit attempts to map influence-response functions; however the seminal experiments of S. E. Asch (1953) and the variations that followed (R.Bond and P.B. Smith, 1996) suggest that such an exercise is possible, at least under some circumstances. Recent work by J. Leskovec et al. (2005) also suggests that influence-response functions can be reconstructed from empirical data, derived from online recommender networks.
Assuming that influence-response functions can be constructed in the absence of an unambiguous theoretical framework, we now show that regardless of their origin, it is precisely the functional form of the influence-response function that critically determines the aggregate behavior. This step represents an important advantage of our approach which in effect allows us to compute the equilibria, given only the influence-response functions (i.e. without knowing how they were obtained in the first place).
For tractability reasons, to describe the collective outcomes, we will assume global and anonymous interactions in the population. Specifically, this implies that w ij = w for all i, j ∈ N , where for simplicity we normalize w = 1. Although, these assumptions are crucial for our results to hold it is clear that, in reality, individuals have only limited information about the behavior of others and it is precisely the intricate structure of the social network what leads to a great amount of unpredictability in the collective outcomes (Watts, 2002) .
The study of the collective dynamics accomplished here, however, helps us understand the phenomenon of social influence in its simplest form and constitutes a starting point that we believe will be useful for guiding further research. 
Discrete dynamics (synchronized revisions)
The approach followed in this section is closely related to work of Granovetter (1978 Granovetter ( , 1986 and 1983) in which he analyzes how aggregate outcomes depend on the distribution of preferences in the population (i.e. thresholds). Our approach, however, is conceivable more general in connecting primitive assumptions about the behavior of individuals to different equilibrium outcomes as well as providing a systematic and formal overview of the problem of social influence. In addition, later in the paper, we depart from Granovetter's approach by considering asynchronous updating dynamics as well as stochastic best responses. 22 Consider the following simple dynamics. In each period, all individuals synchronously revise their strategy and choose a myopic-best response. That is, an individual chooses the action that maximizes his utility (or expected utility), given the action of all other individuals in the previous period. This dynamics is consistent with a bounded rationality view of the world in that agents choose a best response to the strategy profile of the previous state, without anticipating that all other agents will also revise (and probably change) their strategy next period. Based on this assumption, we can describe how the fraction of individuals choosing action 1, denoted by I(t) hereafter, evolves over time as follows: where
Therefore, we obtain that
where we define
as the average influence-response function. Then, following the notation introduced above,
r(I(t)) = H(I(t)).
Consider the following cases: and F (q u ) as pdf and cdf respectively. Notice that F (q u ) is the fraction of individuals with thresholds lower or equal to q u . It is straightforward to show that
Hence, the fixed points of F (q u ) correspond with the stationary states of the dynamics.
Furthermore, the shape of F (q u ) determines the stability of the fixed points in interesting ways. Consider first the case where the population is homogenous and therefore all individuals have the same threshold, say I u . Then r(I) is a step function, characterized by an upward threshold I u . As illustrated in Figure 5 .a, the stationary states of the dynamics are In other words, heterogeneity in the population allows for a cascades to occur: initially only a small fraction of individuals adopt action 1 (those that clearly prefer 1 to 0); but due to the positive-externality effects other individuals adopt 1 as well; and so on. In fact, small differences in the distribution of thresholds might lead to radically different equilibrium outcomes. For example, in the beta distribution of thresholds presented above, the cases where µ is slightly above and below 1. These results also highlight the importance of knowing the full distribution of thresholds instead of simply the average, since two distributions with the same average threshold can have very different aggregate outcomes. 24 Returning to the example of public goods with convex production functions, we find that, unlike in the homogeneous case, heterogenous populations may be able to sustain contribu- 
Consider first the case where all individuals have the same threshold, say I d . Then, the influence-response function r(I) is step function characterized by the downward threshold is decreasing, there exist a unique stationary state of the dynamics I * , where I 0 < I * < I 1 , the stability of which will depend on the slope of F (q d ) evaluated at the stationary state I * .
Specifically, if F 0 (I * ) < −1 the dynamics behaves aperiodically, whereas if F 0 (I * ) > −1, the dynamics converges to I * . Finally, if F 0 (I * ) = −1, the dynamics cycles around the value I * .
As an illustration see Figure 6 . Note that, also in this case, the distribution of thresholds has some qualitative impact on the results; however, unlike the positive externality case, the long-run behavior of the dynamics does not depend on initial conditions.
As a consequence of this general result, public goods games with concave production functions, therefore, never converge to a situation where all individuals contribute. This finding contrasts with the result obtained for public goods with convex production functions; thus highlighting our earlier point that superficially similar applications might lead to very distinct collective behavior. 
and therefore,
where f h (q h ) and F h (q h ) for h ∈ {u, d}, represent the marginal density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively of f (q u , q d ).
Therefore,
and therefore
In this case, the stable states depend critically on the shape of F u (I) − F d (I). A general conclusion is that, as long as there is a positive fraction of individuals with a non-degenerate downward threshold, I 1 is never stationary. We focus first on the case where all individuals have the same two thresholds I u (an upward threshold) and I d (a downward threshold). 25 In such a case and as illustrated in Figure 7 .a, given any initial condition, the dynamics As explained earlier, this type of non-monotonic externality seems common in the case of fashionable products. In fact, as the results seem to point out, precisely in fashion one might observe some sort of cyclic or chaotic phenomena, where styles that were popular in the past are reinvented and become popular again. Apart from fashion, non-monotonic externalities also may arise in the context of public good games with an s-shaped production function, thus raising again the importance of knowing the shape of the production function to better predict the collective outcomes.
Insert Figure 7 about here
Continuous Dynamics (asynchronized revisions)
In the previous section, we have considered a discrete dynamics where in every period all individuals choose the action which is a best response to what the remaining individuals did in the last period. In this section, however, we consider a dynamics where only a small fraction of individuals revise every period. There are three main reasons why this asynchronized version of the dynamics seems more appropriate for most contexts. First, although in some situations, actors' decisions will be forcibly synchronized, in general that
will not be the case, thus no synchronous mechanism exists. Second, although we have focused on analyzing how individuals behave with respect to a simple binary decision, in reality, individuals have to face multiple decisions each of which might reflect different aspects of their lives (e.g. which car to buy, political party to vote, TV series to watch, etc.).
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that due to inertia as well as time constraints individuals do not revise (and optimize) all decisions every period. Third, if we assume that only a small fraction of individuals revise every period, the action profile does not vary significantly from one period to another; thus, the action profile at a certain time is a good approximation of the action profiles in the near future, which makes a myopic-best response a reasonable behavioral assumption.
For tractability reasons, instead of analyzing a discrete dynamics incorporating this feature, we study its continuous counterpart; that is, in every period t, individuals revise their strategy at a rate λ > 0 and, as before, if an individual revises her action, she chooses a myopic-best response. The dynamics describing the evolution over time of the fraction of individuals choosing action 1 is therefore:
where e H : [0, 1] → [0, 1] depends on the influence-response functions of the individuals in the population as we will show below.
To compute the stationary states of the dynamics we use standard mean-field theory. Specifically we assume that the transitions from action 0 to action 1 and vice versa take place at the average rate. We consider a population characterized by a distribution of thresholds, noting that the homogeneous case simply corresponds to a particular instance of this more general framework. Recall from the previous section that I q (t) represents the fraction of individuals choosing action 1 at time t with a threshold in the interval [q, q + δ] (where again δ ∼ 0 in the case of positive and negative externalities and δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∼ (0, 0) in the non-monotonic externality case). Hence, the mean-field dynamical equation for each I q (t)
can be be approximated by:
where rate I(t),q (1 → 0) = λ(1 − r q (I(t))) and rate I(t),q (0 → 1) = λr q (I(t)). Noting that r q (I(t)) is the influence-response function of individuals with threshold q. 26 Substituting the expressions for the rates in equation (5), we find that
As the overall fraction of agents choosing 1 in the population is
then it follows that
Now, replacing equation (6) in equation (8), we find that
where, we define
again as the average influence-response function. Thus, following the notation introduced above, we obtain that e H(I(t)) = λ(r(I(t)) − I(t)).
After imposing the stationary condition (
which coincides with the condition obtained in the discrete dynamics. In other words, the stationary states of the discrete and continuous dynamics coincide. However, as we will show next, the stability properties of the stationary states are typically different. Let us again consider positive, negative and non-monotonous externalities separately.
(a) Positive externalities: The influence-response function of an individual is characterized by an upward threshold. These thresholds are distributed in the population according to the pdf f (q u ). Note that, as well as in the discrete dynamics case it can easily be shown that r(I(t)) = F (I(t)) where F (q u ) is the cdf of thresholds. Therefore the dynamical equation is
where again stationary states coincide with the fixed points of the threshold distribution function. In addition, for positive externalities, not only the set of stationary states, but also their stability properties coincide with those obtained in the discrete dynamics. The reason why this holds is that in the positive externality case, the discrete dynamics only exhibited equilibrium behavior (because F 0 (I) ≥ 0 for all I ∈ [0, 1]). The rates of convergence to the stable states, however, now depend on the updating rate λ. To illustrate, consider the distribution of thresholds with cdf F (q u ) represented in Figure 8 . Then, as shown in Figure   9 .a the dynamics converge to state I 0 or state I 1 depending on whether the initial fraction of agents choosing action 1 is above or below the interior solution for F (I * ) = I * .
Introduce 
As illustrated in Figure 9 .b, there exists a unique stationary state which is also stable, 
where F u (q u ) and F d (q d ) are the cdfs of the marginal distributions. Hence, the dynamical
where once again the resulting behavior will depend critically on the properties of the distribution function. It is straightforward to see that, for certain threshold distributions we obtain the dynamics illustrated in Figure 9 .c where there exist two stable states I * 0 and I * such that 0 < I * < 1, again in contrast with the more complicated dynamics of the synchronous case.
To conclude, the analysis of the continuous dynamics (as compared with the discrete version) highlights the importance of the aggregation mechanisms as well as the distribution of preferences. In particular, aggregate outcomes cannot be determined by a simple counting of preferences (or the average preference) since this might generate wrong results. Furthermore, when individuals are subject to social influence, one cannot infer individual dispositions from long run collective behavior, but must also consider the intermediate states of the dynamics that led to it.
Extensions

Stochastic influence-response function
In the previous sections we have studied situations where the influence response is a deterministic function of the social signal I, i.e. r i (I) ∈ {0, 1}, for every i ∈ N . Nevertheless, one of the advantages of our approach is that we can generalize the model to account for 
Given that e I is a random variable, we can rewrite equation (11) as follows:
which is stochastic.
Assume that not only the threshold q ∈ [0, 1], but also the variance σ ∈ [0, L] of the signal (where L denotes the maximum variance) is distributed in the population with a density function f (σ, q). Then, the average influence-response function necessary to obtain the collective outcomes is simply:
An alternative way to motivate stochastic decisions would be to consider a situation where individuals make errors when computing their best responses (case (b) mentioned above).
Assume, however, that the propensity to play an action is exponentially related to its utility 27 ; that is, 
Irreversible dynamics
The dynamics studied in the body of the paper allows for transitions to go in both directions.
That is, an individual choosing action 1 might be willing to choose action 0 and vice versa.
There are some situations, however, where this reversibility in actions is not reasonable; for example, in the implicit externality model presented in Section 2.2 only transitions from action 0 to action 1 are possible. For concreteness, let us focus on the continuous dynamics presented before in the paper. The dynamical equation of this variation of the model is
which in turn implies that
where f (q) is the pdf of the distribution of thresholds in the population.
After imposing the stationary condition, dI(t) dt = 0, we obtain the equation
There are again three possible cases according to the form of the externality: (i) positive externalities (ii) negative externalities (iii) non-monotonic externalities, where we consider in detail only case (i). Note that equation (12) can be written as
which holds if and only if
In what follows we show that state I is sustained in equilibrium if and only if F (I) ≤ I where F (q) is the cdf of the distribution of thresholds in the population. First we shall prove that if I is such that F (I) > I, then I cannot be an equilibrium state. To do so, consider e I such that F ( e I) > e I; then
which in turn implies that there exists a value of e q ≤ e I, such that e I e q < 1. Notice, however, that equation (13) is not satisfied and thus e I is not an equilibrium state.
To complete the proof, take e I such that F ( e I) ≤ e I; we must now show that e I is then an equilibrium state. To do so, we must find { e I q } q∈ [0, 1] such that e I = R f (q) e I q dq and such that condition (13) holds. By assumption, we know that
which allows us to construct e I q in a way that e I q = 1 for all q ≤ e I.
Following similar steps, we can prove that for case (ii) a fraction I of individuals choosing action 1 is stationary if and only if 1 − F (I) ≤ I.
Final remarks
The main goal of this paper was to understand how individual-level decision processes can be classified as well as aggregated to produce collective outcomes. We have focused on situations where individuals make simple binary decisions (adopt or not a certain action) with externalities; that is, where the decision taken by an individual depends on the decision taken by others. We have briefly reviewed a number of literatures in which the social, psychological, and economic origins of this phenomenon have been explained, as well as a wide variety of models of collective behavior in the presence of externalities. It is often the case, however, that when theoretically grounded models are proposed, they are difficult to generalize; in particular it is unclear how one model relates to another. In this paper, we attempt to overcome this problem by presenting a unified and reasonable general framework to encompass externalities that may vary in origin (explicit or implicit externalities) and form (positive, negative and non-monotonic externalities). We therefore treat in a similar way a number of applications, which at face value seem quite different (e.g. public good games and technology adoption, among others).
The condition of independent effects (or similarly pluralistic ignorance) allows us to describe the behavior of individuals as simple influence-response functions: a one-dimensional (i.e. The main finding of this paper (obtained both with the synchronous and asynchronous dynamics) is a qualitative one: on the one hand applications which superficially are very similar, such as public goods games with slightly different shaped production functions, can
give rise to qualitatively distinct collective behavior; but on the other hand, very different applications such as some kinds of public good games and certain kinds of social learning problems might generate similar results. Another relevant aspect of our framework, however, is more of a practical one: it allows for significant heterogeneity across individuals, where heterogeneity is typically hard to incorporate in standard economic models, in our framework heterogenous populations can be modelled just as easily as homogenous populations.
For simplicity, we have analyzed a situation with global and anonymous interactions among the individuals in a population. We believe that the formal and systematic analysis of this benchmark case (i.e., where we abstract from the network structure) is a worthwhile enterprise that helps us understand the phenomenon of social influence in its simplest form and constitutes a starting point for further research. Given the interdisciplinary character of the phenomenon of social influence or more generally contagion processes, there is a wide literature encompassing the fields of economics, sociology, statistical physics and epidemiology trying to introduce networks into the analysis. For tractability reasons, the literature in economics has concentrated on the study of structured networks (i.e. networks with some recurrent pattern). Although some general results have been obtained (e.g. Morris, 2000 and Young, 1998, among others), these results are difficult to apply in practice. For instance Morris (2000) characterizes the threshold for the degree of risk dominance of a certain action in a coordination game, that guarantees its contagion in the population. This condition, although extremely general would be difficult to compute unless the network has some recurrent pattern. As a natural complement to this approach there is also significant work where, also for tractability reasons, the network is considered as random (see for example, disadvantage of most of these models (both the structured and random approach) is that, although they have satisfactorily answered the question of whether the diffusion of a certain behavior will take place or not, the extent (or size) of the diffusion is virtually ignored. 
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